Enrichment levels
Enrichment is the fraction of uranium-235 in the material, and four thresholds matter. Natural uranium is 0.711%. Ordinary reactor fuel sits between 3% and 5%. HALEU runs from 5% to 20%, which is where 12 of the 26 advanced designs tracked here need their fuel. At 20% the material legally becomes highly enriched uranium, and a different safeguards regime applies. Weapons-grade is conventionally around 90%, but by the time uranium reaches ordinary 4.4% reactor fuel roughly 78% of the separative work needed to reach that level has already been done.
The scale
| Class | U-235 content | What it is for |
|---|---|---|
| Natural uranium | 0.711% U-235 | As it comes out of the ground. Only heavy water and graphite reactors can run on it. |
| LEU | above natural, below 5% | Ordinary reactor fuel. Almost the entire operating fleet runs on this. |
| HALEU | 5% to 20% | High-assay low-enriched uranium. Still LEU in law, but a different industry in practice. |
| HEU | 20% and above | Highly enriched uranium. Naval propulsion, research reactors, and weapons. |
| Weapons-grade | about 90% | A convention rather than a threshold; a weapon can be built with less. |
Natural uranium is already a usable fuel, for some reactors
Uranium as mined is 0.711% U-235 and 99.3% U-238. That is enough to sustain a chain reaction if the moderator absorbs few enough neutrons, which is why 46 operating heavy water reactors and the graphite-moderated Magnox designs before them ran with no enrichment plant anywhere in their supply chain. Every other family needs the U-235 fraction raised, and that is a separate industry with four significant participants.
Why 20% is the line that matters
The 20% figure is not a physical threshold. It is a safeguards convention: below it, material is treated as impractical for a weapon without further enrichment, and it is designated low-enriched. Above it, the material is highly enriched uranium, and the licensing, physical protection, transport and international reporting requirements all change.
That is why HALEU, at 5% to 20%, is defined the way it is. It sits as high as the material can go while remaining LEU. Designers want it because more fissile material per unit volume means a smaller core, longer intervals between refuelling, and in fast-spectrum designs the ability to sustain a reaction at all.
What the extra enrichment costs
Enrichment is not linear. Raising a kilogram of uranium to 19.75% takes far more than four times the work of raising it to 4.4%, because each additional percentage point is separated from an ever more depleted stream.
| Product | Natural uranium needed | Separative work |
|---|---|---|
| 1 kg at 4.4% (ordinary LEU) | 8.5kgU | 7.1SWU |
| 1 kg at 19.75% (HALEU) | 42.3kgU | 41.0SWU |
Computed from the standard enrichment equations at a 0.22% and 0.25% tails assay respectively. A kilogram of HALEU takes 5.8 times the separative work of a kilogram of ordinary fuel, and that is before the licensing and transport requirements above 10% U-235, which no published price reflects. See what a SWU is for where these numbers come from.
The proliferation arithmetic
The reason enrichment capacity is watched as closely as it is comes out of the same equations. Taking natural uranium all the way to 90% takes about 208 SWU per kilogram of product. Taking it only as far as ordinary 4.4% reactor fuel, and then feeding that fuel back into the cascade, leaves just 47 SWU per kilogram to go.
In other words, about 78% of the total separative work is already spent by the time uranium becomes ordinary civil reactor fuel. This is a published figure in the nonproliferation literature rather than anything sensitive, and it is the whole reason enrichment plants, not reactors, are the facilities under safeguards scrutiny.
Where each class actually turns up
- LEU below 5% is what essentially the entire operating fleet runs on. Every unit on the fleet list with an enrichment figure of 3-5% is here.
- HALEU is required by 12 of the 26 designs on the SMR tracker. Western production capacity for it is tiny: the facilities on this site are American Centrifuge Plant, Piketon, BWXT TRISO facility, Gillette, General Matter, Idaho National Laboratory EBR-II downblending, Nuclear Fuel Services, Erwin, Savannah River Site HEU downblending, TRISO-X Fuel Facility (TX-1), Oak Ridge, Urenco Capenhurst HALEU line. See the HALEU stage page.
- HEU is used in 15 of the 24 naval propulsion programmes where the enrichment class is on record. A submarine core enriched high enough never needs refuelling in the hull's life, which is an operational advantage no civil reactor has a reason to want.
- Weapons-grade material is covered under nuclear weapons stockpiles, kept deliberately separate from the civil fleet pages on this site.
Sources
- Definitions and the 20% threshold: IAEA Safeguards Glossary
- HALEU definition and supply position: US Department of Energy, HALEU Availability Program
- Naval fuel enrichment classes: Federation of American Scientists and IAEA reporting, per programme page
- Feed and separative work figures are computed on this page from the standard enrichment equations
How these sources are used, including the corrections applied on top of them and what is deliberately left blank · download the underlying data